On Wednesday, the NBA's official store, NBAStore.com, announced their statistics for selling replica jerseys over the course of the 2010-11 regular season. To what likely came as a surprise to some (myself included), the jersey of LeBron James overtook Kobe Bryant's jersey's long held position at the top of the selling charts.
Such news may seem surprising when considered in light of LeBron's semi-disastrous recent history in public relations, stemming from last July "The Decision" television special. Of course, when you consider that the last time LeBron had the highest selling jersey was his rookie year, perhaps you could make an argument his jersey-selling "success" is simply the result of the fact that one of the best active player's in the game changed not only his number, from 23 to 6, but team, from Cleveland to Miami. Such changes obviously rendered LeBron's previous Cleveland jerseys obsolete - especially when you consider how severe a change LeBron seemed to be making through The Decision, his Cleveland and Miami jerseys seem to almost represent more than just two different chapters in his career but almost two entirely different characters.
Perhaps the above factors are reasons enough to explain why the news of LeBron's successful jersey selling campaign was so well-traveled, especially beyond any business or marketing circles, but also into sports circles. The very fact that USA Today felt it was newsworthy is likely due to how LeBron's jersey success flies in the face of the general regard that he is generally regarded in a negative light.
However, I would argue that such news of jersey sales is just as vital to the modern, post-Jordan NBA as any sort of highlights from last night or playoffs seedings. Jordan made the business of selling so much part of today's game that having a sneaker deal and other merchandising success is now vital for any athlete in the NBA to be considered a successful investment. Granted, being a winner in the playoffs, on the stat sheet, on the highlight reel helps merchandise move into homes, so the relationship between success on the court and in the market are certainly confounding. To any cynic, let alone fan of the modern, hyper commercialized, overly capitalistic, sports climate, this opinion is hardly breaking new ground.
However, it is interesting how the NBA, like so many other businesses have made their business success part of their strategy for inciting further business success. It's not merely the obvious fact that the NBA aims to produce success in the market just as much if not even more than success in the game itself, but it's the fact that the NBA seems to be promoting the news of its business successes as reasons to illicit further additional market growth. Goldman and Papson explain how such forms of self-aware advertising have become the norm in today's marketing environment. They note how after World War Two, advertising experienced a boom as Americans had more time and resources to spend on goods and used more media that were susceptible to convincing how they should such time and resources. In 1970s, consumers complained of being manipulated by their daily inundations of being convinced to buy things, so in response advertisements became more realist and absurdist to mask the semblance of pandering. In the 1980s, market research showed that consumers complained that these ads had over-corrected, creating advertisements that were too ambiguous and messages that were fundamentally unclear. Thus, in 1990s, led by the firms Wieden & Kennedy, Chiat/Day, ads become self-aware, in order to provide consumers with the sense that ads were "bantering back" upon themselves to speak for consumers' severe disenchantment. These processes, Goldman and Papson argue, have created a climate in which modern advertisements straddle the line between “fetishized formulas and clever self-reflexivity.”
Though its unclear how much the NBA has pushed these jersey sales results into the news beyond simply making their statistics available to a clearly interested public, it is interesting case of a company becoming invested in making their business successes known to consumers in sales related markets and not just to their investors. It seems like the only plausible reason the NBA would want the public to know how many jerseys they sold is to advertise their own business success to convince consumers through a new, less overt, heavy-handed channel that their brand is worth consuming. At the very least, such a story is simply the NBA acknowledging the fact, within a "fetishized formula and clever self-reflexive" form that they are just as interested in selling jerseys and other merchandise that came to rise in the Jordan-era (and of course perhaps as a result of Jordan's success) as selling tickets; and that their success in selling more reason for them to sell you even more jerseys.
Sources:
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5j-37vWgiMkZMtPtP7WSUXahai0GQ?docId=CNG.887a901975c3f70a5f64f725a13a9937.2d1
http://content.usatoday.com/communities/gameon/post/2011/04/surprise-lebron-james-passes-kobe-bryant-in-jersey-sales-miami-heat-los-angeles-lakers-boston-celtics-rajon-rondo-nba/1
Goldman, Robert & Papson, Stephen. "Advertising in the Age of Accelerated Meaning" 1996. In The Consumer Society Reader edited by Juliet B. Schor and Douglas B. Holt, p81-98. New York: The New Press, 2000.
Thursday, April 14, 2011
Monday, February 21, 2011
Blake Griffin and Kia
Obviously most observers have described the final round of the 2011 NBA Dunk Contest was a clinic in product placement. Yet Blake Griffin's "choice" to include a KIA sports car in his final try in the 2011 NBA Dunk Contest also reveals an interesting facet of the NBA's status in the organizational field of the market. As defined by Scott and Davis, organizational fields consist of organizations with diverse types of organizations that share both cooperative and competitive relationships. The sheer cooperation of the NBA and KIA in producing such a commodity like the Dunk Contest says less about the NBA selling out and more about the modern codependence of organizations. Perhaps this example of organizational cooperation can be extrapolated beyond the Dunk Contest to other instances of what are commonly considered simple "product placements." As suggested by KIA's inclusion of Griffin's winning dunk in their subsequent marketing campaign, the modern advertising mode of product placement is likely more of an example of organizations increasingly inhabiting a common field: consumerism.
Sources:
http://blogs.wsj.com/drivers-seat/2011/02/20/blake-griffin-jumps-kia-wins-slam-dunk-contest/
http://www.google.com/hostednews/canadianpress/article/ALeqM5j1sgqurmGk-9He37BcWT-6femK5A?docId=6569146
Organizations and Organization. W. Richard Scott and Gerald F. Davis. p117-120. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Press, 2003.
Sources:
http://blogs.wsj.com/drivers-seat/2011/02/20/blake-griffin-jumps-kia-wins-slam-dunk-contest/
http://www.google.com/hostednews/canadianpress/article/ALeqM5j1sgqurmGk-9He37BcWT-6femK5A?docId=6569146
Organizations and Organization. W. Richard Scott and Gerald F. Davis. p117-120. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Press, 2003.
Wednesday, November 3, 2010
The NCAA's EMI
Do female college basketball players become pregnant at lower rates than female professional basketball players? Do female college basketball players have fewer children than male college basketball players? Suppose both statements are true.
Evidence from anecdotes is hardly ever convincing, but I do remember Christmas night, 2004, going out to eat a local diner with some friends (we, too, were surprised that any establishment was open). To our luck, we actually sat at a table directly across from two of the starts of the nearby college basketball team (two future NBA draft picks from a final four team that year). To our surprise, we were also sitting directly across from these players’ children.
Evidence from ESPN is hardly ever convincing, but in the case of Candace Parker it appears that the WNBA star actually missed the 2009 season due to pregnancy. Not only is it amazing that a professional athlete would choose to miss a year of her career, it is amazing the sport would seemingly be so supportive of an elected year off. Obviously, I am unfamiliar with the formal and informal policies and attitudes of the WNBA towards pregnancy. I imagine it would be similar to the challenges most women in the work force face – pregnancy could cost them a promotion, higher wages in the future and obviously also the immediate losses of productivity for the business. Perhaps Parker’s status in her industry (she is arguably the face of her sport and has been given expectations that she might be a Jordan-like usher of women’s professional basketball) affords her a level of job security most role players might not afford. A similar explanation could be made for Lisa Leslie’s decision to miss the 2007 season - Leslie was one of the most productive female players of all time.
Perhaps this competition phenomenon explains why there are not more female college basketball players who miss time due to pregnancy. Even the most irreplaceable and recognizable stars of the college game could not only lose playing time and an opportunity for a professional career, but they could also risk forfeiting their scholarship status (as far as could be determined, it seems that the policy of the NCAA is that students may be granted an extra year of eligibility if they become pregnant but are not guaranteed one). College players, even revenue players as Sanderson discusses, have very little leverage.
In addition, socioeconomic status likely plays a role in the presumed lower number of pregnancies in women’s college basketball. Few college students have the resources or stability to provide for a child, let alone the typical, disadvantaged black student-athlete that plays college basketball. This is especially true given the recent study showing how poorly the NCAA covers the expenses of its student athletes (which likely also dampens the argument that the NCAA might spring for the costs to distribute birth control measures to its female athletes). Perhaps also there is a selection bias inherent amongst the female college athlete population. These individuals, in addition to being talented, are likely very disciplined, responsible, and accountable, and thus would be at a low risk of becoming pregnant without considerable foresight.
All qualifications aside, it seems that perhaps if these conditions for female student athletes at the collegiate level do in fact exist, then an even stronger case ought to be made in favor of actually compensating collegiate athletes – especially those who play revenue athletics. Anyone who follows college sports is likely familiar with how obsessive the NCAA’s policies to protect the amateur status are. All human capital arguments about the value of education aside (Becker), along with the less scientific, more subjective, American-mythos ideals about the principles of hard work and education, it is clear that the majority of these athletes are given a raw deal – especially those who take part in revenue athletes that generate millions of dollars annually for their programs. Allen Sanderson, an economics lecturer at the University of Chicago, has argued that the majority of these students suffer even further from a “reverse Robin Hood effect” as the funds from generated by athletes in revenue sports, who typically come from disadvantaged, minority, impoverished households, are actually used to fund scholarships for athletes in non-revenue sports, who typically come from advantaged, white, affluent households.
Therefore, by this account, choosing a scholarship just another track that produces, replicates, and solidifies inequality in America. A similar process is described by Samuel Lucas in what he terms “effectively maintained inequality.” Lucas writes “Effectively maintained inequality posits that socioeconomically advantaged actors secure for themselves and their children some degree of advantage wherever advantages are commonly possible. On the one hand, if quantitative differences are common, the socioeconomically advantaged will obtain quantitative advantage; on the other hand, if qualitative differences are common the socioeconomically advantaged will obtain qualitative advantage.” Student athletes on NCAA scholarships, especially low SES women who are thus provided additional disincentives for pregnancy, are essentially tracking for continued disadvantage.
Sources:
http://sports.espn.go.com/espnmag/story?id=3967891
http://sports.espn.go.com/wnba/news/story?id=2690361
http://sports.espn.go.com/ncaa/news/story?id=2875521
http://www.tampabay.com/sports/basketball/college/article1099926.ece
http://www.ncpanow.org/research?id=0018
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/23/books/review/23goldstein.html
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/HumanCapital.html
http://sports.espn.go.com/ncb/news/story?id=5793192
http://www.allbusiness.com/management/3494934-1.html
http://sociology.berkeley.edu/faculty/lucas/emifinal.pdf
Evidence from anecdotes is hardly ever convincing, but I do remember Christmas night, 2004, going out to eat a local diner with some friends (we, too, were surprised that any establishment was open). To our luck, we actually sat at a table directly across from two of the starts of the nearby college basketball team (two future NBA draft picks from a final four team that year). To our surprise, we were also sitting directly across from these players’ children.
Evidence from ESPN is hardly ever convincing, but in the case of Candace Parker it appears that the WNBA star actually missed the 2009 season due to pregnancy. Not only is it amazing that a professional athlete would choose to miss a year of her career, it is amazing the sport would seemingly be so supportive of an elected year off. Obviously, I am unfamiliar with the formal and informal policies and attitudes of the WNBA towards pregnancy. I imagine it would be similar to the challenges most women in the work force face – pregnancy could cost them a promotion, higher wages in the future and obviously also the immediate losses of productivity for the business. Perhaps Parker’s status in her industry (she is arguably the face of her sport and has been given expectations that she might be a Jordan-like usher of women’s professional basketball) affords her a level of job security most role players might not afford. A similar explanation could be made for Lisa Leslie’s decision to miss the 2007 season - Leslie was one of the most productive female players of all time.
Perhaps this competition phenomenon explains why there are not more female college basketball players who miss time due to pregnancy. Even the most irreplaceable and recognizable stars of the college game could not only lose playing time and an opportunity for a professional career, but they could also risk forfeiting their scholarship status (as far as could be determined, it seems that the policy of the NCAA is that students may be granted an extra year of eligibility if they become pregnant but are not guaranteed one). College players, even revenue players as Sanderson discusses, have very little leverage.
In addition, socioeconomic status likely plays a role in the presumed lower number of pregnancies in women’s college basketball. Few college students have the resources or stability to provide for a child, let alone the typical, disadvantaged black student-athlete that plays college basketball. This is especially true given the recent study showing how poorly the NCAA covers the expenses of its student athletes (which likely also dampens the argument that the NCAA might spring for the costs to distribute birth control measures to its female athletes). Perhaps also there is a selection bias inherent amongst the female college athlete population. These individuals, in addition to being talented, are likely very disciplined, responsible, and accountable, and thus would be at a low risk of becoming pregnant without considerable foresight.
All qualifications aside, it seems that perhaps if these conditions for female student athletes at the collegiate level do in fact exist, then an even stronger case ought to be made in favor of actually compensating collegiate athletes – especially those who play revenue athletics. Anyone who follows college sports is likely familiar with how obsessive the NCAA’s policies to protect the amateur status are. All human capital arguments about the value of education aside (Becker), along with the less scientific, more subjective, American-mythos ideals about the principles of hard work and education, it is clear that the majority of these athletes are given a raw deal – especially those who take part in revenue athletes that generate millions of dollars annually for their programs. Allen Sanderson, an economics lecturer at the University of Chicago, has argued that the majority of these students suffer even further from a “reverse Robin Hood effect” as the funds from generated by athletes in revenue sports, who typically come from disadvantaged, minority, impoverished households, are actually used to fund scholarships for athletes in non-revenue sports, who typically come from advantaged, white, affluent households.
Therefore, by this account, choosing a scholarship just another track that produces, replicates, and solidifies inequality in America. A similar process is described by Samuel Lucas in what he terms “effectively maintained inequality.” Lucas writes “Effectively maintained inequality posits that socioeconomically advantaged actors secure for themselves and their children some degree of advantage wherever advantages are commonly possible. On the one hand, if quantitative differences are common, the socioeconomically advantaged will obtain quantitative advantage; on the other hand, if qualitative differences are common the socioeconomically advantaged will obtain qualitative advantage.” Student athletes on NCAA scholarships, especially low SES women who are thus provided additional disincentives for pregnancy, are essentially tracking for continued disadvantage.
Sources:
http://sports.espn.go.com/espnmag/story?id=3967891
http://sports.espn.go.com/wnba/news/story?id=2690361
http://sports.espn.go.com/ncaa/news/story?id=2875521
http://www.tampabay.com/sports/basketball/college/article1099926.ece
http://www.ncpanow.org/research?id=0018
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/23/books/review/23goldstein.html
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/HumanCapital.html
http://sports.espn.go.com/ncb/news/story?id=5793192
http://www.allbusiness.com/management/3494934-1.html
http://sociology.berkeley.edu/faculty/lucas/emifinal.pdf
Friday, August 13, 2010
Jordanization
Both had fathers who played their sports professionally. Both had amateur sports successes in their own rights. Both achieved celebrity status early on – not only due to their family background but also from their status as prodigies in their respective sports. Both ostentatiously flaunted their celebrity status in high school, one by driving a Porsche and the other by taking Brandy to prom (the singer – had I meant the drink this would not at all been unique). After high school, both immediately became professional athletes, thus fulfilling the obvious teleos set forth before them by their privileged backgrounds. And by privilege, it should be noted that the advantages provided by their professional fathers were not merely limited to superior genetic endowment, increased economic support, or favorable social status. Such privilege also includes the training and insight, both formal and informal, that comes from being able to grow up in proximity to a professional athlete. Being raised with such privileges clearly tainted both players’ attitudes and augmented both players’ self-evaluations – as is evidenced not only by their love of the limelight at an early age, but also by the fact that both athletes would demolish their status as teammates by making trade demands.
Yet despite these similarities in background, the public perceptions of each player could not be more different. The first, Ken Griffey Jr., was affectionately nicknamed by the media as the kid. The second, Kobe Bryant, was scornfully nicknamed by himself as black mamba. Griffey was loved for his fun style of play. Kobe was accused of playing for himself. And in short, Griffey was seen as the Jordan of his sport, while Kobe was just seen as his sports’ latest Jordan impersonator.
Obviously, the personality differences between the two made a huge difference in the disparity between their perceptions. Griffey is affable, kind, quiet, and ultimately fun-loving and likable. Kobe is aggressive, motivated, curt, competitively, and ultimately out for himself, or his legacy. And while Griffey suffered injury after injury that further enhanced our sympathy for the Kid, Black Mamba exacerbated our villainous expectations by finding himself in Eagle, Colorado.
Yet perhaps there are two other explanations for their divergent public appearances: the sport they play, and their position in their sport’s history.
First, their separate sports: Because there are fewer opportunities to truly make an impact within a baseball game, it can be a lot harder for selfishness or entitlement to affect the sport’s joint outcomes, such as games or entire playoff series. Such mentalities are isolated within single at bats. Obviously, group atmospheres such as the dugout, the clubhouse, and the steroid bar still exist. And there are plenty of baseball players who contaminated teams via these group settings (Reggie Jackson, A-Rod, Manny Ramirez, and actually even Griffey himself once he developed an addiction to napping).
Secondly, and more specifically, the separate histories of the sports, and these sports’ relationships to the market, are more likely to have shaped these players’ different perceptions. Griffey did not have to follow in Jordan's footsteps, and thereby avoided being compared to him after every move – something that ultimately brought Kobe a lot of criticism (despite how much he himself invited these comparisons). Obviously the comparison between Jordan and Griffey fails miserably when both players’ accomplishments are considered. Even before he was injured, Griffey failed to play in many meaningful games and was overshadowed during his prime by not just one, but two other players in his sport (and if Griffey truly was not using PEDs, then it is even more tragic that Griffey had to play in McGwire and Sosa’s PED shadow).
Yet in a marketing sense, the Griffey and Jordan comparisons appear more favorable. At the time, Griffey’s presence in advertising was practically as salient as Jordan’s was. Nike launched the Air Griffey’s to supplement to the Air Jordan’s. Just as Jordan had Gatorade, Griffey had Pepsi. And last but not least, Super Nintendo released Ken Griffey Jr.’s Winning Run*.
So why did Griffey’s market presence resemble Jordan? And why is that efforts for Kobe to supplant Jordan never succeeded? Jordan was not the first athlete to capitalize on and cultivate his success as marketing power, but he was the first in the modern area to reach across multiple platforms and achieve widespread success. His ubiquity represented a new model, what Ritzer terms McDonaldization, which was brought about through a competitive adaptation forged by market forces, a process DiMaggio and Powell define as institutional isomorphism.
According to DiMaggio and Powell, institution isomorphism is the process by which organizations in a common field come to resemble one another. This can occur through coercive, normative, or mimetic forces. Coercive forces are enforced from outside influences in society, such as cultural expectations. Normative forces result from professions who consider certain pathways of behavior to produce legitimatization and hence accreditation. Mimetic forces refer to how uncertainties in the market force behaviors to resemble the safest, surest bet.
Jordan’s success as a marketing figure created cultural expectations for how Griffey ought to be branded (coercive forces). When Griffey reached his prime athletically and charismatically, Jordan’s success provided an obvious, proven, passageway for channeling Griffey into a market force (normative forces). Jordan’s pathway of widespread exposure offered not only a path for Griffey’s brand to be legitimatized, but also the safest bet against the market (mimetic forces). Hence, institutional isomorphism helps explain why Griffey’s status in the market caused him to resemble Jordan.
This endpoint for both Jordan and Griffey is best understood with Ritzer’s theories of McDonaldization. McDonaldization, Ritzer notes, is a model of hyper efficiency, calculability, and control beyond that which is offered by traditional forms of bureaucracy (thus Ritzer supplements Max Weber’s bureaucracy). Jordan, and Griffey in his footsteps, thus became hyper organized and calculated, and controlled public business practices, working as corporate endorsement organizations.
The history of several markets suggests that there is a cost to being the second organization in a field that adopts the McDonaldization (or Jordanization) approach. For instance, Burger King is – obviously - following footsteps in McDonalds, and will always have a lower status for never quite being McDonalds. Conversely, USA Today keeps its arguable worth as a simply by being the first the adopt McDonaldization in its field. Additionally, being late to the market may be easier to overcome in some fields rather than other (Target is a notable exception to the oldest brand carrying the most status in a field), but Kobe was never going to live up to Jordan’s image, even before Eagle, Colorado.
Thus Kobe was perceived as Burger King while Griffey was seen as USA Today. Kobe not only had to live in Jordan’s shadow on the court, but in the market. And he never had a chance.
Notes and References
* It’s debatable whether or not their status as the face of the sport was thrust upon both Griffey and Jordan or if they cultivated their own statuses themselves. Likely, their commercial status was the result of both processes. Regardless, their ubiquity is more indicative of the process in which modern athletes are now marketed: as entertainers, and ultimately, as brands.
http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/columns/story?columnist=caple_jim&id=5245433
http://www.jockbio.com/Bios/Bryant/Bryant_bio.html
http://faculty.babson.edu/krollag/org_site/org_theory/Scott_articles/dimag_powel.html
http://www.mcdonaldization.com/whatisit.shtml
Yet despite these similarities in background, the public perceptions of each player could not be more different. The first, Ken Griffey Jr., was affectionately nicknamed by the media as the kid. The second, Kobe Bryant, was scornfully nicknamed by himself as black mamba. Griffey was loved for his fun style of play. Kobe was accused of playing for himself. And in short, Griffey was seen as the Jordan of his sport, while Kobe was just seen as his sports’ latest Jordan impersonator.
Obviously, the personality differences between the two made a huge difference in the disparity between their perceptions. Griffey is affable, kind, quiet, and ultimately fun-loving and likable. Kobe is aggressive, motivated, curt, competitively, and ultimately out for himself, or his legacy. And while Griffey suffered injury after injury that further enhanced our sympathy for the Kid, Black Mamba exacerbated our villainous expectations by finding himself in Eagle, Colorado.
Yet perhaps there are two other explanations for their divergent public appearances: the sport they play, and their position in their sport’s history.
First, their separate sports: Because there are fewer opportunities to truly make an impact within a baseball game, it can be a lot harder for selfishness or entitlement to affect the sport’s joint outcomes, such as games or entire playoff series. Such mentalities are isolated within single at bats. Obviously, group atmospheres such as the dugout, the clubhouse, and the steroid bar still exist. And there are plenty of baseball players who contaminated teams via these group settings (Reggie Jackson, A-Rod, Manny Ramirez, and actually even Griffey himself once he developed an addiction to napping).
Secondly, and more specifically, the separate histories of the sports, and these sports’ relationships to the market, are more likely to have shaped these players’ different perceptions. Griffey did not have to follow in Jordan's footsteps, and thereby avoided being compared to him after every move – something that ultimately brought Kobe a lot of criticism (despite how much he himself invited these comparisons). Obviously the comparison between Jordan and Griffey fails miserably when both players’ accomplishments are considered. Even before he was injured, Griffey failed to play in many meaningful games and was overshadowed during his prime by not just one, but two other players in his sport (and if Griffey truly was not using PEDs, then it is even more tragic that Griffey had to play in McGwire and Sosa’s PED shadow).
Yet in a marketing sense, the Griffey and Jordan comparisons appear more favorable. At the time, Griffey’s presence in advertising was practically as salient as Jordan’s was. Nike launched the Air Griffey’s to supplement to the Air Jordan’s. Just as Jordan had Gatorade, Griffey had Pepsi. And last but not least, Super Nintendo released Ken Griffey Jr.’s Winning Run*.
So why did Griffey’s market presence resemble Jordan? And why is that efforts for Kobe to supplant Jordan never succeeded? Jordan was not the first athlete to capitalize on and cultivate his success as marketing power, but he was the first in the modern area to reach across multiple platforms and achieve widespread success. His ubiquity represented a new model, what Ritzer terms McDonaldization, which was brought about through a competitive adaptation forged by market forces, a process DiMaggio and Powell define as institutional isomorphism.
According to DiMaggio and Powell, institution isomorphism is the process by which organizations in a common field come to resemble one another. This can occur through coercive, normative, or mimetic forces. Coercive forces are enforced from outside influences in society, such as cultural expectations. Normative forces result from professions who consider certain pathways of behavior to produce legitimatization and hence accreditation. Mimetic forces refer to how uncertainties in the market force behaviors to resemble the safest, surest bet.
Jordan’s success as a marketing figure created cultural expectations for how Griffey ought to be branded (coercive forces). When Griffey reached his prime athletically and charismatically, Jordan’s success provided an obvious, proven, passageway for channeling Griffey into a market force (normative forces). Jordan’s pathway of widespread exposure offered not only a path for Griffey’s brand to be legitimatized, but also the safest bet against the market (mimetic forces). Hence, institutional isomorphism helps explain why Griffey’s status in the market caused him to resemble Jordan.
This endpoint for both Jordan and Griffey is best understood with Ritzer’s theories of McDonaldization. McDonaldization, Ritzer notes, is a model of hyper efficiency, calculability, and control beyond that which is offered by traditional forms of bureaucracy (thus Ritzer supplements Max Weber’s bureaucracy). Jordan, and Griffey in his footsteps, thus became hyper organized and calculated, and controlled public business practices, working as corporate endorsement organizations.
The history of several markets suggests that there is a cost to being the second organization in a field that adopts the McDonaldization (or Jordanization) approach. For instance, Burger King is – obviously - following footsteps in McDonalds, and will always have a lower status for never quite being McDonalds. Conversely, USA Today keeps its arguable worth as a simply by being the first the adopt McDonaldization in its field. Additionally, being late to the market may be easier to overcome in some fields rather than other (Target is a notable exception to the oldest brand carrying the most status in a field), but Kobe was never going to live up to Jordan’s image, even before Eagle, Colorado.
Thus Kobe was perceived as Burger King while Griffey was seen as USA Today. Kobe not only had to live in Jordan’s shadow on the court, but in the market. And he never had a chance.
Notes and References
* It’s debatable whether or not their status as the face of the sport was thrust upon both Griffey and Jordan or if they cultivated their own statuses themselves. Likely, their commercial status was the result of both processes. Regardless, their ubiquity is more indicative of the process in which modern athletes are now marketed: as entertainers, and ultimately, as brands.
http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/columns/story?columnist=caple_jim&id=5245433
http://www.jockbio.com/Bios/Bryant/Bryant_bio.html
http://faculty.babson.edu/krollag/org_site/org_theory/Scott_articles/dimag_powel.html
http://www.mcdonaldization.com/whatisit.shtml
Tuesday, August 3, 2010
Republicans buy sneakers, too
In 1990, Charlotte mayor Harvey Gantt, an African American politician often hailed as a symbol of “The New South,” unsuccessfully challenged conservative Jesse Helm, a three-term white incumbent with a dubious history regarding racial segregation, for a seat in the United States Senate. Though this contest was obviously inherently encumbered with social symbolism and historical weight, perhaps the most memorable and momentous contribution from this election was in fact provided a third party: Michael Jordan. When Mayor Gannt’s campaign staff asked Jordan, a North Carolina native and fellow African American, to endorse the Gannt campaign, Jordan not only declined, but did so for the reason that "Republicans buy sneakers too."
Jordan was properly criticized for allegedly choosing his own net-worth over his self-worth, for protecting his bottom line expenses at the expenses of his social duty, and for safeguarding a black expense sheet rather than championing Black America. Jordan’s devotion to a profit motive was made clearer when Jordan would later endorse a democrat for president, fellow hoops alum Bill Bradley; destroying any doubt that Jordan’s aversion to Gantt’s campaign was simply Gannt’s leanings to the left. And despite the fact that history may fail to appreciate how ugly the Gannt/Helm campaign truly was and that perhaps Jordan was actual somewhat wise to avoid getting involved in such a sharply divisive contest, Jordan’s non-stance is continually cited as an abhorrent epitome of excessive selfishness of public figures. However, though choosing to be politically and socially apathetic in a democracy is arguably less admirable than being politically and socially engaged in one, perhaps reevaluating Jordan’s alleged selfishness reveals it to be more a result of Jordan’s own commitment to greatness.
It seems, then, the ethos of Jordan’s excuse is twofold. Firstly, Michael Jordan’s social worth is clearly defined by his status as an athlete. Everyone and his or her mother have debated whether or not entertainers like Jordan should be responsible for both cultivating and expressing socially relevant opinions. In regards to the latter, everyone and his or her mother usually reach the conclusion that no, entertainers should not share these opinions. And by definition alone, no, entertainers by trade are not required to be politically or socially informed and in fact doing so might actually take entertainers efforts away from where their talents lie (everyone and his or her mother’s economist define this as opportunity cost). Yet, everyone and his or her mother eventually offers the qualification that entertainers are also citizens of the democratic state, and thus, it is not their duty as entertainers to have political opinions, but rather their duty as democratic citizens ([Plato’s] Republic[ans] buy sneakers, too). Of course, this civic-duty-caveat (You down with CDC? Yeah, you know me!) only applies if the specific everyone and his or her mother likes the entertainment provided by the entertainer in question, in which case the entertainer is not allowed encouraged to hold political opinions, but to share them at will at everyone via his or her mother’s favorite talk shows. Thus, in another major booyah for democratic socialization, the first fold of the ethos of Jordan’s excuse is exhausted in the name of the CDC.
Yet the second half of Jordan’s excuse is more interesting as it essentially betrays Jordan’s arrogant, self-absorbed borderline-obsessive mission for greatness. Refusing to endorse Mayor Gannt would have been a choice that would have had its consequences, some of which potentially negative; but declining to make such an endorsement and offering the blatant capitalistic driven reason “Republicans buy sneakers, too” is an entirely separate choice that obviously engenders significantly more negative attention. Jordan did not simply stand to be uninvolved, but refrained from a political endorsement to protect his own commercial endorsement. If you think someone might disapprove of your choice, you can likely wager they will disapprove of your choice even more completely when they find out your decision is ultimately motivated by money. Whether Jordan realized his excuse was essentially making the least-popular move possible for the ends of selling more sneakers, Jordan was clearly either distracted or driven by a desire to be great. Granted, the desire to be a great sneakers salesman may or may not be all that noble an aim, but Jordan’s excuse was fundamentally a reveal of his overwhelming competitive desire to be the best which distracted him or shielded him from the negative consequences of his excuse. Fundamentally, “Republicans buy sneakers, too” is simply another insight into Jordan’s unabashed desire to be great. Jordan was so willing to apply himself, so willing to fail and to stay faithful to his own goals (and yes, selling sneakers has questionable worth as far as goals go) that he was effectively unconcerned with the consequences of doing so.
Over the years, Jordan’s weaknesses have been flouted – he is a gambler, an adulterer, a questionable teammate, and ultimately competitive to a fault. Yet most of those who make this last point cite his poor basketball decisions (Kwame Brown), when in fact “Republican’s buy sneakers, too” is an even more obvious outcome of his will to win. The legend of Jordan is this commitment to excellence. It is the legend of being cut from the freshman basketball team only to become the best basketball player of all time. We praise him for his stubborn, uncompromising desire to be great in the face of the chance of failure, yet “Republicans buy sneakers, too” represents the dual side of that which we praise him for: the loss of perspective that results from being consumed with winning. Those who have criticized “Republicans buy sneakers, too” as the beginnings of a selfish generation of athletes neglect that self-interest existed long before Jordan (Holler, Adam Smith!) and fail to appreciate Jordan’s most important trait – his competitiveness. Jordan’s excuse cannot simply be dismissed as selfishness when we simultaneously laud him for his competitiveness to the extent that we have in our culture. Jordan’s excuse cannot be simply criticized nor praised: it is a perfect microcosm of Jordan’s dual side in our social folklore. Jordan is often quoted as saying, “You miss 100% of the shots you don’t take.” Maybe we haven’t taken a shot at appreciating “Republicans buy sneakers, too” as the most consummate, self-illuminating, quote from the most important athlete of our time.
· http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/motorsports/nascar_plus/news/2001/02/20/nascar_politics/
· http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jesse_Helms
· http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/page2/story?page=granderson/070702
· http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1355/is_12_97/ai_60041430/
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